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Factors of Party System Europeanisation:  
a Comparison of Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro 
Danica Fink-Hafner
abstract: For the former Yugoslav republics involved in the 99–995 War, the 
EU’s demands are not only defined by the relationship of these EU-aspiring countries 
to EU political criteria and harmonization with the acquis communautaire, but prima-
rily, and very importantly, in relation to maintaining peace and developing security in 
the region. Our primary research interest is to find an explanation for the variations 
seen between Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro in their responses to very similar EU 
demands. While the three analysed countries share some common characteristics 
(former communist rule, involvement in the War in former Yugoslavia, postponed 
transition to democracy and Europeanization pressures), their relations with the EU 
as well as their national party system competitions regarding EU matters have differed 
quite significantly. Variations in the three countries’ national party system mechanics 
in the field of EU matters are explained by the three following variables: institutionali-
zation of the national party system; the European socialization of national party élites 
and voters’ attitudes to their country’s integration into the EU. 
Key words: Europeanization, party system institutionalization, European party 
socialization, voters’ attitudes to EU integration, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro
Introduction
Most post-socialist countries have been confronted with the challenges associ-
ated with transformation (social, economic, politico-institutional). Some have not 
only had to face problems of building the institutions and developing the practices 
of a democratic political system and a market economy, but also those of building 
an independent state, including the establishment of institutions previously set up in 
the political centres of the former multinational states they used to belong to (such as 
Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Estonia and the former Yugoslav republics). 
The Central and Eastern European post-socialist countries (including Slovenia), as 
well as Romania and Bulgaria, and more recently the countries of former Yugoslavia, 
have also been exposed to adaptations to Europeanization processes. Unlike in the 
case of the recent post-socialist EU newcomers, in the former Yugoslav Republics 
(except Slovenia) Europeanization pressures have not been primarily focused on the 
institutional adaptation or harmonization of national law with the acquis, but on issues 
and policy adaptations closely linked to the 1991–1995 War and its implications for 
this region bordering the EU. 
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Like the older member states and EU newcomers (Lippert, Umbach and Wessels 
2001), potential EU candidates have also been passing through several stages of “EU 
Europeanization”. Even in the early stages the integration of post-socialist countries 
into the EU started to interfere with their national political systems. The EU’s indirect 
influence on national political systems and their practices took place through its evalu-
ation and estimation of the level of democracy achieved (first in the applicant countries 
and then the candidate countries). It was also possible to see institutional adaptation 
in the EU post-socialist countries, and this was partly the result of the coordinating 
EU affairs and implementing policies of the EU in response to its demands made dur-
ing the negotiating process, and partly an expression of the economic, political and 
security interests of those states seeking full EU membership. While the development 
of the coordination of EU matters could have been observed in all the post-socialist 
EU members of the 2004 membership wave, only in Slovakia did the EU interfere in 
internal political matters and influenced the party system’s mechanics. 
In this article we will focus on several countries that emerged from the former 
Yugoslav republics, where EU demands are strong not only in the relationship of these 
EU aspiring countries to EU political criteria and the acquis, but primarily, and very 
importantly, in relation to maintaining peace and developing security in the region. Our 
primary research interest is not the changing role of the EU but finding an explanation 
for the variations seen between Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro in their responses to 
very similar EU demands. Building further on the example of the Slovak path to the 
EU, we will look at factors that influence the party system’s mechanics in a particular 
field – the inclusion of a particular country in EU integration processes. 
We are searching for an explanation of these variations by taking into account 
controlled variables (common characteristics), common Europeanization (European 
Union) pressures and several hypothetically explanatory variables. The controlled 
variables include: former communist rule, involvement in a war and a postponed tran-
sition to democracy  We hypothesize that possible explanatory variables that have led 
to the very different characteristics of party system mechanics in Croatia, Serbia and 
Montenegro are: a) institutionalization of the party system; b) European socialization 
of national parties; and c) characteristics of voters’ attitudes to their country’s integra-
tion into the EU.
After presenting the theoretical framework we describe some common charac-
teristics of the analysed countries in order to take account of the “controlled” vari-
ables. A closer look at national variations in EU integration processes is followed by 
an analysis of the factors that, in our opinion, can explain these variations. For the 
analysis we used data gathered as part of the following research projects financed by 
the Slovenian Research Agency: Political Science Research Programme (P5-0136), 
the project Politics in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia (J5-6154-0582-15) and the 
project involving visiting professor Robert Ladrech (contract no. 1000-06-780001-6). 
The research findings are summarized in the conclusion. 
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THEORETICaL FRaMEWORK
Europeanization and National Party Systems 
The Europeanization concept is understood in many different ways (e.g. Bulmer 
and Burch 1998; Hix and Goetz 2001; Olsen 2002a). Some commentators also 
include a clarification of its direction: “top-down”, “bottom-up” or a combination 
of both (e.g. Ladrech 1994; Bulmer and Burch 1998; Knill 2001; Goetz 2001; Dem-
mke 2002; Radaelli 2003). In clarifying our understanding of Europeanization we 
start with Radaelli (2003: 30) who defines Europeanization as “the processes of: a) 
construction; b) diffusion; and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and 
norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then 
incorporated within the logic of domestic (national and sub-national) discourse, 
identities, political structures and public policies.” Our research interest is restricted 
to the top-down Europeanization of certain aspects of party system adaptation. 
The pioneers of the framework of research into the Europeanization of political par-
ties and party systems (Mair 2000 and Ladrech 2002) defined three areas of political 
party Europeanization: national political parties, the national party system and the tran-
snational party level of organization and functioning. In this paper we are focusing only 
on the national party system. This includes an aspect that Ladrech (2002) calls “patterns 
of party competition”, whereas Mair (2000) uses the term “mechanics of party competi-
tion”. Ladrech’s more thorough explanation of the term “patterns of party competition” 
includes the politicization of the EU in national politics, a change in the tactics and 
strategies by parties designed to capitalize on the “EU issue”, the presence of a strongly 
pro- or anti-EU party and the nature of a party’s ”dominant coalition” in Panebianco’s 
terms (Ladrech 2002). On the contrary, Mair’s definition (2000) is a little simpler – it 
includes competition at the pro- versus anti-European integration level. In this article we 
are focusing on the mechanics of party competition only in terms of the (re)creation of 
competition between pro-European versus anti-European integration-oriented parties.
Impact of Europeanization on national party system mechanics
So far, research in the West has shown no significant European Union impact on 
national party systems (Mair 2000; Ladrech 2002; Pennings 2006; Poguntke, Aylott, 
Carter, Ladrech and Luther, eds. 2007), while studies of the post-socialist 2004 EU 
member states has mostly shown that there has been little direct impact of the EU 
on national party politics (Lewis and Mansfeldová, eds. 2006). Some Europarty 
impacts on national party political orientation (“bringing them closer to the standard 
European families”) can be found in several parties in the CEE countries (Enyedi and 
Lewis 2006). The only real exception among the 2004 post-socialist EU newcom-
ers was Slovakia, which had serious difficulties in building democracy during the 
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1990s1 and was the only applicant country to have been negatively assessed according 
to the EU political criteria in the 1997 screening carried out by the European Commis-
sion. However, it met the criteria after the change brought about by the 1998 elections 
(Rybář and Malova 2004; Henderson 2005; Rybář 2005). Recently, Slovakia again 
raised questions of EU policy regarding national political developments that led to 
a decline of some important aspects of democracy2 
When looking at the possible explanatory variables for Slovakia’s exceptional 
status among the 2004 new EU member countries, the relationship between the fulfil-
ment of the EU political criteria on behalf of a particular country and the number of 
EU impacts on the national party system competition was considered (Fink-Hafner 
and Krašovec 2006). Slovakia stood out as a case where the gap between the EU’s 
prescribed political criteria and Slovakia’s fulfilment of them was considered to be 
quite large. The EU criticism especially stressed problems in respecting the rights of 
the parliamentary opposition, the protection of minority rights and stability of statue 
institutions (for more information, see Rybář and Malova, 2004). As the party in 
government was electorally successful, it played a two-level game: it made statements 
supporting pro-European policies, but at the same time it did not change activities in 
the national arena that had been criticized on behalf of the European Commission. 
Among the 2004 post-socialist new members of the EU Slovakia was the only country 
where EU actors decided to become directly involved in a national party system’s 
mechanics. Since the mechanics were determined by three factors (the leading party 
in government, the opposition party and voters), the EU actors focused their activities 
on the opposition party and voters in order to change the course of the national party 
competition. The EU’s “social influence” (Rybář 2005) brought about the holding of 
free and fair parliamentary elections in Slovakia: a strategy of distinguishing between 
the Slovak government of the day and the Slovak voters, and bringing together EU 
and non-EU states in donating substantial sums of money to Slovak non-governmental 
organizations for their pre-election activities. This encouraged a strong voter turnout 
(beneficial for the opposition) and let Slovak citizens know that they should choose 
their political representatives carefully in the 1998 parliamentary elections because 
”Slovakia had its destiny in its hands”. The new ruling coalition gave high priority 
to EU accession and demonstrated its policy to catch up with the enlargement wave 
1 See the report Nations in Transit 2007 at 
 http://www.freedomhouse.hu//images/fdh_galleries/NIT2007/nt-slovakia.pdf.
2 In the aforementioned report it is noted that the installation of the new (the Fico-led) government in 
2006, comprised of coalition partners from the pre-1998 era (nationalist and populist forces which were 
linked with an authoritarian system/non-liberal democracy), means that the democratic reform gains 
made in the past eight years might be challenged to some extent. The list of the new government‘s faults, 
which are causing the worsening of Slovakia‘s democracy score, includes its overtly partisan tendencies 
in concentrating power through a number of key political appointments and by adopting measures to 
curb independent regulatory institutions; its statements and actions curbing the independence of courts, 
attempts to abolish the Special Court and the Special Attorney‘s Office (which had been successfully 
investigating corruption and organized crime); and the new government‘s efforts to increase government 
regulation in certain sectors threatened to increase corruption.
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(Haughton and Malová 2007). This is how Slovakia became case D, as shown in 
Table 1. All the other 2004 post-socialist new EU countries fit into box A in Table 1. 
Table 1: The EU’s impacts on the national party system 
The EU’s impacts on 
national party system 
competition
––––––––––––––––––
Fulfilment of the EU’s 
political criteria?
NO / MINOR BIG
MINOR GaPS
a
a candidate /accession country 
with little/no EU impact on 
national party competition
(national political consensus)
B
/
SIGNIFICaNT GaPS
C
a country has not expressed 
any interest in integrating 
with the EU
D
significant EU impact on 
national party competition
(a two-level game)
Note: adapted from Fink-Hafner and Krašovec (2006)
While Table 1 could be useful in helping us understand other more recently accepted 
EU post-socialist countries, it is not simply applicable to countries in former Yugoslavia, 
apart from Slovenia (case A in Table 1). The cause of the large difference between the 
new EU countries and all the republics of former Yugoslavia except Slovenia is the direct 
or indirect involvement of the latter in a war between 1991 and 1995, i.e. the war and its 
consequences made the whole region a special security and foreign affairs matter for the 
EU (Tzifakis 2007). However, the three countries included in our comparative analysis 
have had varying levels of success so far in meeting EU preconditions (in addition to the 
Copenhagen political criteria) and becoming involved in EU integration processes. 
Europeanization in terms of European pressure (setting preconditions and conditions 
for integration into the EU, political pressures on potential candidate states to fulfil the 
EU’s expectations) is included in our analysis as a common factor. The variables that in 
our expectation may explain variations in the three cases include: a) national party system 
institutionalization; b) the European socialization of national party élites (links of national 
party élites with European party federations); and c) voters’ attitudes to their country’s 
integration into the EU. With the last variable there should be a distinction between “ab-
stract” voter support for integration into the EU (general support, which is not necessarily 
based on information about all EU preconditions) and “informed” support for integration 
into the EU (support that includes awareness of the preconditions defined by the EU).
We believe the model in Figure 1 explains the party system mechanics in the three 
analysed countries (Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro) to an important extent. It includes 
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the following three variables: a) voters’ preferences that put pressure on the party system 
(bottom-up pressure); b) the achieved level of party system institutionalization offers 
voters a party choice; and c) party élite linkages and socialization through European 
networking with their parties’ European counterparts influence the institutionalization 
of parties and party system (top-down pressures).
Figure 1: A model of party system mechanics in the Europeanisation process
Top-down pressures:
European socialisation  
of national party elites➪
Institutionalization of a party system/
Offering clear political support for integration with EU
➩
Bottom-up pressure:
Voters‘ preferences in favour of
 integration with the EU
Institutionalization in politics means “that political actors have clear and stable 
expectations about the behaviour of other actors” (Mainwearing and Torcal 2006: 
206). From a party system mechanics point of view, we start with the assumption that 
when a party system is institutionalized voters can make reasonable choices and are 
thereby also in a position to put pressure on party orientations. The institutionalization 
of a party system is best understood as a continuum of party system characteristics 
expressed in several aspects: stability of the main parties in the party system; strong 
party roots in society and according political legitimacy to parties on behalf of political 
actors3 (ibid.) as well as party organizations not being subordinated to the interests 
of leaders or external centres of power, such as a sponsor organization or coterie 
(Janda 1980; Panebianco 1988; Mainwearing 1999; Mainwearing and Torcal 2006). In 
a weakly institutionalized party system, parties often appear in and disappear from the 
party arena, patterns of party support are unstable (including support for established 
parties in the party system), parties have difficulty structuring and articulating popular 
preferences, voters have difficulty identifying with particular parties, and there is a lack 
of autonomous party organizations which go beyond being an extension of individual 
leaders or coteries. Weak party system institutionalization is even linked to problematic 
democratic consolidation, as parties in such circumstances are unsure of their survival 
3 Parties are accepted as a necessary part of democratic politics.
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or stability in terms of electoral support and may opt to prevent democratization (Birch 
2001; Thames 2007). What may be of a special importance in the process of Europeani-
zation is the finding that in otherwise generally weakly institutionalized party systems 
relatively institutionalized individual political parties can be found (Thames 2007). 
The European socialization of national party élites is understood in terms of so-
cial constructivism theory (see e.g. Diez 1999; Risse 2004), which explains European 
integration processes as the creation of shared conceptions of an identity or role. One 
of its main theses is that interaction with other states or individuals leads to shared 
conceptions of identity or role, which further influences the creation of preferences of 
further cooperation and integration. National party élites joining with their counterpart 
European party federations do interact with their counterparts from EU member and 
candidate states. The expectation that these interactions have an impact on national 
party élites of the new EU member states has so far received inconclusive empirical 
support. According to the quite limited research on post-socialist countries’ parties’ 
linkages with European party federations (e.g. Lajh and Krašovec 2004; Krašovec 
and Lajh 2004; Lewis and Mansfeldová, eds. 2006), European party linkages could 
lead to minor and sometimes modest national party changes. However, Enyedi and 
Lewis (2006: 236) point out Europarties’ impacts on the political orientations of some 
existing EU member parties as a result of the parties of the new EU member states 
moving towards membership of one of the standard European families, including 
a party name change, or a rethink of existing EU member parties’ relationship with 
other national parties. Although Europarties sometimes encourage collaboration or 
even the merging of national parties, so far there has been no clear evidence of the 
direct impact of Europarties on national parties’ ideological or behavioural change. 
Since political parties in the analysed (potential) candidates for EU integration have 
been largely based on the extreme politicization of ethnic feelings (unlike in the 
partially already studied Central and Eastern European countries) we expect that the 
European socialization of national parties may be a relatively important factor in the 
recreating of party-system institutionalization. Although so far (in the cases of Central 
and Eastern European countries) it only seems to have been the Polish party system 
that has internalized a pro/anti-European cleavage (Lewis 2006: 13), we can probably 
expect that the phenomena will be more evident in those countries with potential losers 
in the approaching process of European integration – both in society (voters from the 
losing sectors of society) as well as in the élite (especially in those parts of élites with 
war-related responsibilities and/or illegally gained wealth).
Common characteristics and relationships of the analysed countries 
with the EU
The three analysed countries share many important common characteristics: 
former communist rule, involvement in the 1991–1995 War, strong nationalist party 
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orientations and intensive electoral engineering during the 1990s prolonging the power 
position of parties that won the first multi-party elections in the respective countries 
– and by so doing – also postponing the transition to a democracy by a decade. Due 
to these characteristics as well as other EU security and regional interests (Tzifakis 
2007), a special new set of similar preconditions was established for all three countries 
– including the joint demand to hand over alleged criminals to the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as a result of the Civil War in the first half of 
the 1990s (Pridham 2006; Tzifakis 2007).
Table 2: Brief presentation of countries’ relations with the EU with respect  
to EU pre-conditions and political conditions 
State EU  pre-conditions
Content of other 
problematic issues/ 
emphasised EU politi-
cal conditions beside 
the Copenhagen 
political criteria
Status of the integration with 
the EU
Slovakia* 
during 
accession 
negotiations
No special 
pre-conditions 
in 2000
no In 1997 negative EU evaluation, 
but positive after 1998 elections; 
Full EU membership on 1 May 
2004
Croatia co-operation 
with the ICTY
(the reason for 
the interruption 
of negotiations)
Minorities; return of 
refugees;
bilateral problems with 
neighbours fight against 
corruption
Stabilisation and association agree-
ment signed in October 2001;
Application for EU membership 
in March 2003; EU accession 
negotiations started in June 2004, 
but postponed in March 2005; 
continuing since 3 October 2005
Serbia co-operation 
with the ICTY
(the reason for 
the interruption 
of negotiations)
human rights and mi-
norities; civilian control 
over the military, 
constructive approach 
as regards Kosovo
EU negotiations on stabilisation 
and association agreement started 
on 10 October 2005, but called off 
on 3 May 2006; de-frozen again on 
13 June 2007
Montenegro co-operation 
with the ICTY
(the reason for 
the interruption 
of negotiations)
fight against corruption 
and organised crime
EU negotiations on stabilisation 
and association agreement started 
on 10 October 2005, but called off 
on 3 May 2006 (S+MG); (re)started 
26 September 2006; Stability and 
Association agreement initialled on 
16 March 2007
ICTY... International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
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Since the Croatian government started an official policy of integration into the EU 
earlier (the strategic political initiative started with the change in government in 2000; 
Croatia officially applied for EU membership on 21 February 2003) and has to some 
extent been reacting more in accordance with the EU’s expectations than the other 
two analysed politico-territorial units (a short postponement of accession negotiations 
in 2005 due to Zagreb’s failure to arrest war crimes suspect General Ante Gotovina), 
it has been catching up with the path that Slovakia took to the EU4. While Serbia is 
clearly a laggard, Montenegro is becoming an “in between” case due to the relatively 
strong interests of part of the economic and political élite in maintaining the status quo 
(independence from Serbia, but non-compliance with EU standards in certain critical 
condition policy fields other than collaboration with the ICTY). At the time of writing 
(early July 2007), Croatia was in the process of accession negotiations, Montenegro 
had just signed the Stability and Association agreement with the EU, while Serbia was 
just about to restart negotiations on a stability and association agreement with the EU, 
which had been frozen due to its failure to hand over major war criminals (Table 1).
VaRIaTIONS IN INSTITUTIONaLIZaTION OF NaTIONaL 
PaRTy SySTEMS 
National variations
Although national party systems have some common characteristics, they also 
differ. They have responded to European integration issues differently. In Croatia, de-
mocratization and Europeanization have been linked together. In Montenegro, Europe-
anization was primarily linked with winning the country’s independence from Serbia, 
and it currently seems to be in a stalemate position; while in Serbia democratization 
and Europeanization have been delayed. 
A specific feature of Croatian politics is that the HDZ (Hrvatska demokratska 
zajednica) opposition party won the first multiparty elections in 1990, contrary to the 
expectations of the reformed Communist Party, which had led the transition. The HDZ 
prevailed in a context of the War by the successful manipulation of ethnic feeling and 
political institutions up until 2000. The predominant party (HDZ) was the key cause 
of totalitarian tendencies in the Croatian state (Lalović, 2000). In spite of the fact 
that during the 1990s Croatia was considered a ”delegated” democracy, a non-liberal, 
parliamentary democracy, a defective democracy or even an authoritarian, populist, 
nationalist populist régime (Kasapović 2000: 47), there were peaceful electoral cycles 
even against the background of war, and voters did accept the parliamentary rules of 
the game. On the one hand, we could say that the Croatian party system did become 
institutionalized during the 1990s in some aspects, such as the continuous presence of 
4 It should be stressed that the Croatian path to the EU has been partly influenced by the context of EU 
decision-making concerning Turkey’s candidacy (see e.g. Sošić 2006; Pridham 2006).
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a core of political parties in the party system, the net volatility (according to Kasapović 
(2001: 34) it was 17.4 percent between 1990 and 1995) and party identification was 
56 percent in 19955, (but dropped to 36 percent in 2003) (Čular 2005: 140). On the 
other hand, the predominant party in the party system (the party in power) was the 
HDZ – a charismatic organization (Kasapović 2001: 22). The president of the HDZ 
was also the President of Croatia between 1990 and 2000, which was at that time 
a semi-presidential system. Croatian politics in the 1990s were not democratic and 
may be described as the “institutionalization of nationalist discourse and authoritarian 
democracy”, the “delayed consolidation of democracy” (Čular 2000) or ”democratic 
despotism” Vejvoda (2000). In the struggle to maintain its ruling position, the HDZ 
(the Croatian Democratic Community), the party of both the president and the parlia-
mentary majority, even succeeded in broadening its electoral support to include not 
only the Croatian diaspora, but also Croats living in Bosnia-Herzegovina (then already 
formally an independent state). Croat voters from Bosnia-Herzegovina benefited from 
financial help from the Croatian national budget (Kasapović 2001; Cvrtila 2001) and 
behaved like a “clientelistic group” (Kasapović 2001: 23). Some HDZ voters preferred 
a strong leader more than voters of other parties (Čular 2005: 157). As early as the 
1990s political parties attracted very low levels of trust. According to public opinion 
polls in 1990 and 1999, only about 12 percent of voters substantially or fully trusted 
political parties, while at the end of 1999 46 percent did not trust the parties at all 
(Čular 2005: 124). Party identification in Croatia decreased immediately after the de-
freezing of the transition to democracy (ibid.: 167–168). 
After the Civil War and the death of the charismatic leader Franjo Tudjman, Croatia 
moved towards a democratic system, including institutional reforms introducing a par-
liamentary system and a democratic electoral process. Čular estimates that institutional 
socialization after the 2000 elections brought about the socialization of the party élite 
and led to a shift in party politics away from extreme political positions (ibid.: 156). 
However, the overall picture of the party system shows that party preferences and the 
level of democratic legitimacy in 2003 are a little lower than in the previous period 
(ibid.: 152). In spite of the fact that more democratically-oriented voters left the HDZ 
(ibid.: 157), only the HDZ did not lose its principal democratic support among the 
electorate (ibid.: 152). The watershed elections of 2000 did bring about a shift towards 
a more fragmented party system, with a prevailing conflict between centre-left and 
centre-right parties, but the HDZ still received the relatively stable support of part of 
the electorate (ibid.: 152). The 2000 elections saw a shift from the predominant cleav-
age of the 1990s (a territorial-cultural versus an ideological-cultural cleavage) towards 
5 In 1995 voters with a quite strong party identification showed support for considerably stronger au-
thoritarian tendencies (Čular 2005: 143). These voters were primarily supporters of the HDZ, which 
was consistently more authoritarian in its tendencies than the other main parties (ibid.: 152). As it was 
revealed that party identification was related to satisfaction with democracy, it could be understood why 
in the period between 1990 and 2000 mainly non-democrats were satisfied with democracy in Croatia 
(ibid.: 144).
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ideological-cultural cleavages characteristic of the divisions between traditionalism 
and modernism. The Croatian party system shifted away from predominant nationalism 
and ethnocentrism towards socio-economic divisions marked by a cleavage between 
the beneficiaries and losers of the 1990s (Zakošek 2001). There were stable opposition 
voters who mostly felt their economic position was worse in 2000 than in 19906  The 
Social Democratic Party (SDP) (a successor of the reformed Communist Party), the 
main representative of opposition parties, became the party of the prime minister after 
the 2000 watershed elections and started a policy of Croatian joining the European 
integration processes. Other parties adopted a pro-European orientation, at least in 
their discourse, with a delay.
Although up until early June 2006 Serbia and Montenegro were the two former 
Yugoslav republics that had remained in the framework of the common state after the 
independence of all the other former Yugoslav republics, their party system develop-
ments differed in some important ways. While in both former republics there were old 
élites which were able to freeze the transition to a democracy (see e.g. Goati, ed. 1998; 
Ramet 2006), the question of Montenegrin independence made political developments 
in this republic somewhat idiosyncratic. 
The logic of party system development in Serbia and Montenegro cannot be un-
derstood without taking into account the broader picture of conflicts in the former 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Probably the most plausible explanation is 
linked to the thesis that it had been a centre-periphery conflict that had so far been 
decisive for the party system logic in the two units. In the transition from 1980 to the 
1990s political engagement on an ethnic basis became predominant in the nationally 
heterogeneous former Yugoslav republics (Serbia and Montenegro as well as Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Macedonia). Political élites in the former republics played nationalist 
cards in their political conflicts and added to the ethnic homogenization within “their 
own” republics (Goati 2000b: 179). In each ethnically heterogeneous republic the 
parties of the majority ethnic group (apart from Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had three 
major ethnically-based parties) strove for a quite broadly defined “ethnic territory” 
and more or less minimized rights of other ethnic groups. In these terms the centre/pe-
riphery cleavage in the framework of former Yugoslavia was expressed in the range 
of independent states that were created (at the beginning of the 1990s the creation of 
the independent states of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and, at 
a later date, in 2006, Montenegro. Thus, Serbia was left on its own). Even in July 2007 
Kosovo remains to be “a question of all questions”7 for the Serbian government.
6 Zakošek (2001: 120) states that the share of ”losers” of the 1990s among stable opposition voters was 
72.9 percent, while among the stable HDZ voters the share of losers was 27.2 percent and among former 
HDZ voters who transferred their votes to opposition parties it was 64.5 percent (data are from the Izbori 
2000 survey conducted by the Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb). 
7 Pitanje svih pitanja (an estimation on behalf of the Serbian foreign minister during his visit in Ljubljana; 
TV news at 7 p.m. on Slovenian TV station POP-TV and national RTV Slovenia on 16 July 2007).
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The phenomena of segmented pluralism within the republics led to the political 
homogenization of ethnic minorities and in some cases led to their demands for self-
determination (as with the Albanians in Kosovo and Metohia). Although party systems 
in both units were marked by the “ethnification of the political sphere” (predominant 
party organization and functioning on an ethnic basis), this happened to a larger extent 
in Serbia (Goati 2000b: 180). Among the indicators of the range of party system eth-
nification phenomena is the fact that Albanian parties refused to even participate in the 
party system of the Republic of Serbia and created an illegal party system of their own, 
while in Montenegro the parties of ethnic minorities (Muslim, Albanian) participated 
in a Montenegrin party system from the beginning of its development and, beside the 
parties in favour of ethnic homogenization, there were also some which opposed it 
(ibid.: 179). 
In addition, the cleavage between parties of the national majority and the parties of 
national minorities in Montenegro was accompanied by the cleavage between pro-in-
dependence and pro-common state supporters. In the context of war, the politicization 
of ethnic feelings and intensive institutional engineering in favour of the parties in 
power, it was impossible to talk about democracy and reasonable voter choices. Yet 
in Serbia the polarized pluralism anti-democratically-oriented SPS and JUL were able 
to occupy the central position and take advantage of a situation with a double opposi-
tion (Goati 2000b: 197). On the contrary, the Montenegrin party system developed in 
a moderately pluralistic way during the 1990s and became more polarized only in the 
context of Montenegro distancing itself from Serbia in the 1997–2000 period. The 
end of Serbian and Montenegrin involvement in the war in other former Yugoslav 
republics between 1991 and 1995, and the international intervention in Kosovo, Serbia 
and Yugoslavia in 1998–99 changed the social and political context of both party 
systems. The first peaceful change in power occurred in Montenegro, with presidential 
elections in 1997 and parliamentary elections in 1998. A little later, in 2000, change 
also happened in Serbia (Miller 1997; Goati 2000a; Ramet 2006), although this was 
achieved with more difficulty than in Montenegro. 
Serbian and Montenegrin party systems have not yet been institutionalized (Goati 
2000b), although it is possible to identify several continuous parties within each of 
the two party systems. In both units, the party roots have been quite weak, as re-
flected in the rather large shifts in party electoral support. Besides a relatively large 
electoral volatility8, the overall large importance of party leaders9 can be noticed in 
8 According to Goati (2000b: 200), the average electoral volatility during the 1990s in Serbia was 34.6 
percent and in Montenegro 34 percent (in Montenegro the greatest was in the watershed elections in 
1998 – 63.4 percent). 
9 According to research, support for particular party leaders even has a predictive power for electoral 
support for parties (see Rejting lidera i izborne orientacije građana Srbije i Crne gore krajem 2004 
godine ./ (Raitings of Leaders and Election Oreintations amnong Serbian and Montengerin citizens at 
the end of 2004, Centar za politikološka istraživanja i javno mnenje, Institut društvenih nauka, Beograd, 
January 2005).
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both Serbia and Montenegro (ibid.) and quite significant external centres of power 
can also be identified. In Serbia in particular there have been cases where the secret 
services and economic élites have prospered from war profits and illegal activities, and 
in Montenegro economic élites and some political élites have prospered from illegal 
economic activities10. In spite of the fact that after the 2000 political change Milošević 
lost the army’s support and the government arrested him and sent him to The Hague, 
the assassination of Djindjić, a leader of the more liberal, pro-European Democratic 
Party in 2003, this had shown the level of external party centres of power influence in 
Serbia (for more information, see Ramet, 2006).
Contrary to Serbia, the pro-European political stream gained predominance in the 
Montenegrin parliament after the May 1998 parliamentary victory (Goati 2000b: 182)11  
As the Montenegrin political élite was engaged in democratic change, changes in owner-
ship and international linking up, it clashed with opposing interests within Montenegro 
as well as in Serbia and the federal level of the joint state. Demands for a confederal 
state and for Montenegrin independence became two expressions of its ”reactive 
confederalism” (Goati 2000b: 183). Due to the high level importance of this kind of 
centre/periphery cleavage, the centre-right versus centre-left cleavage was secondary. In 
2000 pro-confederal (pro-independence) parties won 62 percent of parliamentary seats 
(49 out of 78) in the national Montenegrin parliament (Goati 2000b: 180).
In 2000 Serbian political conflicts within the cleavage of a pro-European orienta-
tion (pro-modernization) versus traditionalism (anti-modernization) traditionalist 
political options still prevailed, as shown in their parliamentary strength (the three 
main traditionalistic parties of the SPS, the JUL and the SRS gained 187 (74.8 percent) 
parliamentary seats) and their black-red coalition government fought for “a continu-
ity of politico-economic development”, against the full introduction of democracy, 
a market economy and links with economically developed Western countries (Goati 
2000b: 181). On 12 April 1999, during the NATO bombing (24 March–9 June 1999), 
the National Assembly went as far as unilaterally deciding to join a federation with 
Russia and Belarussia. 
10 Montenegro has been very vulnerable to drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering as well 
as financial crimes and has a significant market for smuggled goods (see e.g. International Narcotics 
Control Report 2007, released by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 
accessed at http://podgorica.usembassy.gov/policy/reports/070305.html, 6.7.2007 and the analysis by 
Vanja Čalović at Balkananalysis.com on 11 August 2005, accessed at Balkananalysis.com: http://www.
balkanalysis.com/?p=597, 6.7.2007). Even politicians in the highest positions in Montenegro have been 
accused of being involved in illegal activities. For example, in July 2007 it was reported that at a court 
in Bari, Italy, Milo Djukanović was accused of being involved in an international mafia gang smuggling 
cigarettes and benefiting financially from this activity (Slovenian weekly newspaper Nedelo, 24 June 
2007, p. 3). In the same article it was reported that Djukanović had recently opened his own private 
university and predicted the setting up of several new enterprises.
11 Beside the pro-European coalition “to live a better life” – “Da živimo bolje” (composed of the DPS, 
NS CG, SDP), which gained 49.5 percent of votes and 53 percent of seats in parliament) there were 
also some additional small parties with mandates (the LS CG, DS and DUA), which together with the 
coalition won 58.3 percent of votes and 62.8 percent of seats (Goati 2000b: 182).
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Since the political change in Serbia in 2000 democratization processes have been 
linked with Europeanization processes. Two clusters of parties have been created in 
terms of the pro-European (all the relevant parties) versus anti-European cleavage 
(Šešelj’s Serbian Radical Party and the Socialist Party of Serbia – Miloševič’s former 
party). While the general pro-European orientation is not in question, the practical im-
plementation of EU preconditions along with the concrete facing up to the causes and 
consequences of the war in the first half of the 1990s have remained very problematic 
(Komšić 2007).
Table 3: National variations in party system changes, 1990–2006
CROaTIa SERBIa MONTENEGRO
PREDOMINaNT 
CLEaVaGES IN PaRTy 
COMPETITION 
In the 1990s:
nationalism, 
traditionalism vs. 
modernism
Since 2000:
C-L vs. C-R
majority national 
parties vs. minority 
national parties;
traditionalism 
(nationalism, anti-
Europeanism) vs. 
modernism (civic-
mindedness, pro-
Europeanism)
majority national 
parties vs. minority 
national parties;
pro-independence 
vs. pro-Yugoslav 
(pro-Serb); C-L, 
pro-European vs. 
predominant C-R 
(anti-European) 
LOGIC OF CHaNGE 
IN POWER SINCE 
UNFREEZING OF 
THE PROCESS OF 
DEMOCRaTISaTION
WATERSHED 
ELECTIONS 
2000;
alternative C-R 
and C-L coalitions 
available
WATERSHED 
ELECTIONS 2000, 
fragmented, weak 
C-L opposition, 
C-R parties available 
for coalition 
governments
WATERSHED 
ELECTIONS 
1997/1998
Djukanović’s break 
up with Milošević 
– Predominance of  
C-L pro-independence 
forces
PREDOMINaNT PaRTy 
INFLUENCE IN 10s
Anti-communist 
party predominant 
until 2000
Transformed anti-
democratic socialist 
party predominant 
until 2000 
Transformed 
communist party
predominant until 
1998
INSTITUTIONaLISaTION 
OF PaRTy SySTEM?
a) stability of main parties  
 in a party system
B) relevant external centres of  
 power (relative to parties)
YES/NO
YES/NO
Occasional 
political pressures 
on behalf of army 
veteran’s interest 
organisations
NO
YES
Secret services, 
organised crime*
YES/NO
YES
organised crime*
* economically-based interest in the status quo
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European party socialization
In line with our understanding of the European socialization of national party élites 
(as presented in the theoretical framework of this article) we expect that in the analysed 
countries national parties’ links with the European party federations would lead to 
the creation of shared European party federations’ conceptions of identity or role. 
We expect that this impact would be expressed also in national parties’ ideological 
positioning in the domestic party arena and in party behaviour.
The main Croatian political parties have longer experiences of links to European 
party federations and other political actors at the EU level when compared with the 
Montenegrin and Serbian situations. Currently, European party links do not only 
include the main Croatian political parties, but also party youth organizations12  The 
Croatian Social Democrats, the party which initiated a clear policy of Croatian integra-
tion into the EU after its parliamentary victory in 2000, has been associated member of 
the Party of European Socialists since April 2004. 
The process of Europeanization can in some aspects at least be seen in the more 
intensive contacts of leading party élite members (especially prime ministers – Ivica 
Račan and Ivo Sanader, who have also been presidents of their parties) since the begin-
ning of the accession stage. The President of the HDZ (the prime minister’s party, 
which led the Croatian accession negotiations with the EU)13, Ivo Sanader (2006) 
stresses not only the import of European values into his party through its links with the 
European party federation European Peoples’ Party (EPP) (the HDZ became a member 
of the EPP in 2002)14, but also using these links for pursuing his party and his country 
interests in relation with the EU15 
A peculiarity of Montenegrin party international socialization is that it started 
by linking with international party organizations, and only recently has it become 
more oriented towards European parties. As shown in the contribution by Komar 
and Vujović, parties included a mention of the EU or Europe mainly in their party 
manifestos, among the general rhetoric, but did not specify any EU-related policies 
12 See information on membership of Croatian party organizations in international party organizations at 
http://www.hidra.hr/stranke/tab1_10.htm.
13 HDZ was accepted into the European Union of Christian parties (EUCD) in 1995.
14 Sanader (2006) stresses the important role of linking with the European Peoples‘ Party federation in 
the period between 2000 and 2003, during which the party was in opposition for the first time since 
1990. The party‘s reorientation under the EPP influence included the intensification of bilateral contacts 
with EPP members (especially those in the region), emphasizing the party‘s European orientation in 
addressing some policy issues, proving that the HDZ shares the values and principles of the EPP (e.g. 
successful integration of national minorities), and developing a network and regional cooperation with 
party counterparts in Southeast Europe 
15 Sanader (2006) also stresses that the EPP party federation helped HDZ interpret Croatia and the whole 
of South-East Europe to EU institutions and EU member states. In September 2005, on the initiative of 
EPP President Wilfred Martens, a letter from nine EU Prime Ministers was sent to British Prime Minister 
and President of the European Council, Tony Blair, asking for the opening of accession negotiations with 
Croatia 
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in Montenegro. There are also no visible organizational adaptations to the processes 
of Europeanization, although contacts of Montenegrin parties with their counterparts 
across the Montenegrin borders are noticeable. Due to the internal characteristics of 
Montenegrin society and politics, the deepening of the pro-European and anti-Euro-
pean cleavages may become more important in future integration processes.
In Serbia, even after 15 years since the first multi-party elections, the political 
and economic élites have problems with inconsistent values – a persistent mixture of 
liberal and collectivist patterns (Lazić 2007). Sociological analysis (Vuletić 2007) has 
shown that political and economic élites have established close mutual links (mem-
bers of the political élite are connected with the economic élite through friendship, 
marriages and other social ties, making the whole élite quite cohesive and powerful). 
Structurally, they do not have a real interest in integration into the EU – quite the 
opposite: the more this goal becomes realistic the more they will probably resist it 
(Vuletić 2007: 99). Rhetorical general talk about integration into the EU could serve as 
a legitimizing source in relation to voters, but it has its limitations. While voter support 
for integration into the EU is uninformed and confused, there is still also a lack of 
the European socialization of Serbian party élites. Milivojević (2007) note the scarce 
close contacts with European institutions involving various actors. Just a few political 
parties have official links with Europarties starting with 2005 and 2006 (Milivojević 
2007; Orlović 2007). Although the Democratic Party (Djindjić’s former party) moved 
from the centre towards a social-democratic orientation by establishing closer links 
first with the Socialist International and later with the Party of European Socialists, 
the DSS came closer to the people’s parties (it can be characterized as a conservative-
ethnic party), and G17 is close to the liberal European party grouping, the impact of 
Europarties should not be overestimated (Orlović 2007: 139–141), especially not in 
relation to domestic variables.
Voter preferences
Voters’ attitudes to their country’s integration into the EU vary considerably among 
the three countries. While in Croatia they are informed of the EU’s preconditions, 
they also support European integration processes. Although a more detailed look at 
public opinion polls shows changes in the amount of support, it has been revealed that 
the majority of the two main parties in the party system representing the centre left 
(SDP) and the centre right (HDZ) do support European integration and the majority 
of several other parties’ voters (HSS, HSLS-LS, HSP, HSU) as well as the undecided 
are somewhat more doubtful16. The swings seen in public opinion polls are probably 
to some extent influenced by informed journalists’ contributions to European debates 
in Croatia. As shown in the analysis of commentary in leading Croatian newspapers 
16 Crobarometar – Travanj 2006, izveštaj, Puls, Zagreb, p. 9.
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in 2004, Croatian journalists expressed argued criticism of the government’s decisions 
and the “insincerity” of Croatian politics vis-à-vis the Hague tribunal and the pos-
sible consequences of these politics for the postponement of negotiations with the EU 
– which indeed happened (Vilović 2005).
In Serbia voters generally support Serbia’s integration into the EU, but the majority 
of them are unaware of the EU’s preconditions. Blagosavljević (2007:51) suggests 
they are confused due to both a lack of information and inconsistent political messages 
about the EU (over the years it has sometimes been praised and sometimes criticized 
according to political parties’ needs). This also results in a low level of trust in the 
EU17. A large proportion of voters believe that the EU brings about the free move-
ment of people (50 percent), an open market (43 percent), democracy (39 percent), 
human and minority rights (27 percent) (Bogosavljević 2007: 56). As many as 50 
percent believe the reason for Serbia’s lagging behind in the integration processes 
is the constantly adding new conditions and blackmailing of Serbia, 23 percent be-
lieve that it is due to the incapability of the domestic leadership and 15 percent the 
mentality of people who are not ready for change (only 12 percent believe there are 
objective obstacles and a need for major reforms in all fields) (Bogosavljevič 2007: 
61). In fact, voters of all parties (pro-European and anti-European) have problems 
understanding the preconditions of integration into the EU, and the majority believes 
that once Serbia fulfils the Hague precondition the EU will invent new additional 
criteria that Serbia needs to meet in order to move forward in the integration process 
(Bogosavljevič 2007: 62). Voters’ general pro-European orientation is also to a certain 
extent misleading, as in 2006 the majority of citizens still felt a personal link to their 
nation, and around one-third of voters of the main political parties in the party system 
(except the Serbian Radical Party and the Democratic Party) as well as the population 
of the non-decided is characterized by very high ethnocentrism. This is true of even 
51 percent of Serbian Radical Party voters and less (18 percent) of Democratic Party 
voters18 
17 According to a survey conducted by the Centar za politikološka istraživanja i javno mnenje Institut 
društvenih nauka in Belgrade in 2004 (Stavovi građana o međunarodnoj zajednici i odnosima Srbije i 
Crne gore krajem 2004. godine, Beograd, januar 2005), 34 percent of Serbian citizens did not trust the 
EU and 46 percent did, at the same time the proportion of distrust in the UN was even lower (48 percent 
did not trust it; 33 percent did trust it) and the international organizations with the lowest trust were the 
Hague Tribunal and NATO, with the same proportions of distrust (70 percent) and trust (13 percent).
18 Low ethnocentrism is characteristic of 34 percent of the non-decided; of 27 percent of those who did not 
want to disclose their voting intentions; 40 percent of non-voters; of 13 percent of the Serbian Radical 
Party voters; 35 percent of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) voters and as much as for 52 percent of 
Democratic Party voters (Istraživanje javnog mnenja Srbije, leto 2006. godine, CeSID, Center for Free 
Elections and Democracy, Belgrade, September 2006, p. 26).
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Table 4: EU strategy and public opinion support for integration with the EU in 
Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro
CROaTIa SERBIa MONTENEGRO
EU STRaTEGy pressures on 
governments
primarily to meet 
EU preconditions
pressures on
governments
primarily to meet 
EU preconditions
pressures on 
governments primarily 
to meet EU
preconditions; 
support for the 
reformed, liberal bloc / 
with a time-lag also for 
MG’s independence
GENERaL PUBLIC 
SUPPORT FOR 
THE COUNTRy’S 
INTEGRaTION WITH 
THE EU
Y Y Y
PUBLIC aWaRENESS OF 
WaR CRIMINaL PRE-
CONDITIONaLITy?
Y 50 % NOT aware Y
Public opinion results as reported by Slobodna Evropa 6..2006 (Internet)
A pro-European orientation clearly prevailed in Montenegro by the end of the 
1990s. In a public opinion survey in April 2000, 80.7 percent of Montenegrin voters 
were clearly in favour of Montenegrin integration into the EU, but only 23.9 percent 
of integration with Russia and Belarussia (contrary to Montenegrin MPs)19  The main 
reason for a pro-European orientation was that Montenegrins expected a better stand-
ard of living, closer to that of the EU20. A survey at the end of 1999 also showed a shift 
in public opinion towards a change in the status of Montenegro. The public opinion 
data were interpreted as a gradual shift towards pro-independence, autonomistic ideas, 
while the still quite strong federalism was becoming “a minority idea, supported by 
the Belgrade régime” (Goati 2000: 180–181). In spite of the relatively strong distrust 
of international organizations, including the EU, held by Montenegrin citizens21, 
19 Source: Javno mnenje Crne gore, 2000, CEDEM 2: 45 as quoted by Goati, 2000: 182).
20 Among the reasons for joining the EU the highest proportion (45 percent of those surveyed in December 
2004) answered it was an improvement of the economic situation and citizens‘ standard of living (Posi-
tion regarding statehood issue and key socio-economic problems, CEDEM, Department of Empirical 
Studies, December 2004, available at www.cedem.cg.yu).
21 According to a survey conducted by Centar za politikološka istraživanja i javno mnenje Institut 
društvenih nauka in Belgrade in 2004 (Stavovi građana o međunarodnoj zajednici i odnosima Srbije i 
Crne gore krajem 2004. godine, Beograd, januar 2005), 21 percent of Montenegrin citizens did not trust 
the EU and 54 percent did, at the same time the proportion of distrust in the UN was only slightly lower 
(28 percent did not trust it; 47 percent did trust it) and the lowest among international organizations 
were the Hague Tribunal (50 percent did not trust it; 27 percent did trust it) and NATO with the same 
proportions of distrust (50 percent) and slightly different trust (27 percent trusted the Hague Tribunal and 
22 percent trusted NATO).
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a pro-EU orientation is predominant among voters. In comparison with Serbian voters, 
Montenegrins are much better informed about the EU’s preconditions regarding one of 
the most sensitive issues in the former union of Serbia and Montenegro – collaboration 
with the ITCY. According to data from the CEMI of 20 April 2006,22 42 6 percent of 
the surveyed supported extradition of war criminals to the ITCY and 42.2 percent were 
against that. Still, in case if collaboration with The Hague was a precondition of further 
integration into the EU 53.7 percent of those surveyed would still be in favour of 
integration and the proportion of opposers to war criminals extradition would decline 
to 27 2 percent  
Comparisons and tentative conclusions
Comparing the impact of national party system institutionalization, the European 
socialization of national party élites and voters’ attitudes to their country’s involvement 
in European integration processes (Table 5) shows an interesting variety of factors 
determining the party system mechanics.
Table 5: Comparative view of national party system mechanics, European party 
socialisation and voters’ pro-European pressures
CROaTIa SERBIa MONTENEGRO
PaRTy SySTEM 
INSTITUTIONaLISaTION?
– stability of main parties  
  in the party system
– strong external party power?
Y/N
 
Y
Y/N 
(interest groups)
N
 
N
Y 
(organised crime, part 
of a state apparatus)
Y/N
 
Y
Y
(organised crime)
EUROPEaN 
SOCIaLISaTION Y N Y/N
VOTERS’ PRO-EU 
aTTITUDES?
– general
– informed
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Y/N
Croatian party élites have been socialized through their links with European party 
federations (as well as other EU actors) for the longest period (compared with the other 
two analysed cases) and at the same time they have been pressured by quite a strong 
pro-European orientation on behalf of voters. National party system mechanics re-
garding EU matters seem to have become closer to the Slovak case, where the party 
22 Acessed at http://www.cemi.cg.yu/vijesti/vi120.php on 10th December 2006.
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system’s mechanics respond to dual pro-European pressures: voters’ preferences as well 
as EU actors’ pressures. Croatian European integration processes seem to have been 
working in a way that is ever more similar to those in Slovakia (from the 1997–2004 
period), involving a push-pull relationship and a two-level game, although the latter 
was largely linked to war-related issues and actors (especially the anti-Hague lobby 
including war veteran interest groups, and for some time even part of the military 
leadership). 
As in Serbia, voters’ support for European integration processes is not predomi-
nantly informed about the EU’s preconditions, the Serbian national party system is 
not in a comparable relationship with the electorate as in Croatia or even Montenegro. 
Still, national party autonomy in Montenegro is endangered by external party power, 
as in Serbia. While in Montenegro it is concentrated in organized crime and unclear 
relationships between the party élite members and economic power functioning against 
European standards, in Serbia the external party power lies not only in war profiteers’ 
economic power but also in segments of the state apparatus still faithful to Milošević’s 
politics (especially the secret services). 
So although at first sight Montenegro seems to have been quite a successful Euro-
peanization story, it may in fact not be the case. Despite the fact that voters’ support for 
integration into the EU is informed (voters are largely aware of the EU’s preconditions) 
an important part of Montenegrin party élites has retained general pro-EU rhetoric. It is 
national party subordination to the economic interests of an important segment of party 
élites that is preventing Montenegro from fulfilling other special EU preconditions 
besides cooperation with the ICTY – especially the fight against organized crime. 
When looking at comparisons we can notice that in Croatia the (although not quite an 
institutionalized) party system is now in a position to respond to both Europeanization 
pressures – from the top and from the bottom. On the contrary, in Serbia, both aspects 
of party system institutionalization are relatively weak (besides that, the bottom-up 
pressure is not informed of the EU’s preconditions). What is common to Serbia and 
Montenegro is the strength of nationally influential centres of economic and political 
power that are outside political parties. In a situation where these centres of power do 
not see their interests in integration processes with the EU, political parties can only 
follow general voters’ preferences of joining the EU with a general pro-EU discourse 
– without doing anything significant in relation to fulfilling the EU’s preconditions. 
From this point of view, another aspect of party system institutionalization (stability of 
the main parties in the party system) is obviously insufficient for the full development 
of party system mechanics responsive to pressures from the top and from the bottom 
in the field of EU matters.
All three cases show a close link between democratization and Europeanization 
processes. It seems that voters’ demands do play quite an important role in shaping the 
party system by offering pro- versus anti-European competition. It also seems that the 
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European socialization of party élites plays a weaker role in this context. Our analysis 
has revealed that voters’ pro-European orientation needs to be analysed in more detail as 
its characteristics are important for the impact on party system competition. A general, 
uninformed pro-European orientation which co-exists with traditionalism and the po-
liticization of ethnic feelings in fact supports merely declaratory pro-EU party politics 
without providing any concrete steps for meeting the EU’s preconditions. 
While undertaking this comparative research we noticed several variables that need 
to be taken into account in further research. Among them is trust in the EU as an 
international organization, which seems to be an additional factor shaping voters’ and 
party élites’ attitudes to integration into the EU. Here EU behaviour (especially its 
inconsistency: politically determined individual decisions are not always in line with 
the generally declared policy) as a variable needs to be taken into account. Unlike the 
previous post-socialist EU candidate (now already member) states, the idiosyncrasies 
of societies in those countries that were involved in the Yugoslav Civil War need to be 
explored in more detail – especially due to the distortion of their social structures – as 
well as the characteristics of their (party) élites, their centres of power as well as due to 
other consequences of the war (the “ghettoization” of these societies). These additional 
variables especially come to the fore when we look at Serbia and Montenegro; while in 
Croatia our preliminary study has also indicated the need to do more thorough research 
into the role of non-party actors (such as the mass media and non-governmental ac-
tors) in shaping the party system’s mechanics when it comes to the area of European 
issues 
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